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BRIEF REPORT
Emotional and non-emotional memories are
suppressible under direct suppression instructions
Kevin van Schie1, Elke Geraerts1, and Michael C. Anderson2
1Institute of Psychology, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
2MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, UK
Research on retrieval suppression has produced varying results concerning whether negatively
valenced memories are more or less suppressible than neutral memories. This variability may arise if,
across studies, participants adopt different approaches to memory control. Cognitive and neuro-
biological research points to two mechanisms that achieve retrieval suppression: thought-substitution
and direct suppression (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergstro¨m, de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn,
2009). Using the Think/No-think paradigm, this study examined whether participants can inhibit
neutral and negatively valenced memories, using a uniform direct suppression strategy. Importantly,
when strategy was controlled, negative and neutral items were comparably inhibited. Participants
reported high compliance with direct suppression instructions, and success at controlling awareness
predicted forgetting. These findings provide the first evidence that direct suppression can impair
negatively valenced events, and suggest that variability in forgetting negative memories in prior
studies is unlikely to arise from difficulty using direct suppression to control emotionally negative
experiences.
Keywords: Memory control; Direct suppression; Think/No-think paradigm.
For better or for worse, people regularly encounter
reminders of things past. Objects, people, or
situations can revive memories of a birthday
celebration or a meeting with a friend, but can
also remind us of the loss of a loved one. When
negative memories intrude, they unsettle us,
undermining our peace of mind, and people
generally take mental action to limit the duration
of such memories in awareness. Studying the
mechanisms underlying this type of memory
control and the limits on their operation is
fundamental to understanding how people adapt
the functioning of their memories in the after-
math of unpleasant life experiences.
The ability to control unwanted memories has
been studied with the Think/No-think (TNT)
paradigm (Anderson & Green, 2001). The TNT
paradigm investigates how suppressing retrieval in
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response to reminders affects a memory’s reten-
tion. Participants first learn cuetarget word pairs
(e.g., ordealroach). They then perform a TNT
task in which they receive trials presenting a cue
from these pairs, and are asked to either recall the
associated memory (i.e., think items), or to
suppress its retrieval (no-think items). A third
set of items (baseline items) is also studied, but is
not shown in the TNT phase. Afterwards, memory
for all pairs is assessed.
On the final test, a counterintuitive effect arises
revealing the consequences of suppressing retrie-
val: no-think items are also recalled more poorly
than baseline items that were neither retrieved nor
suppressed. This difference, known as the negative
control effect, shows that retrieval suppression
causes more forgetting than would ordinarily occur
due to the passage of time, and has been found in
numerous studies (Anderson & Green, 2001;
Anderson et al., 2004; Anderson, Reinzholz,
Kuhl, & Mayr, 2011; Paz-Alonso, Ghetti, Matlen,
Anderson, & Bunge, 2009; see also Anderson &
Huddleston, 2011; Levy & Anderson, 2008, for
reviews). The negative control effect generalises
to non-verbal materials, such as faces (Depue,
Banich, & Curran, 2006; Hanslmayr, Leipold,
& Ba¨uml, 2010; Hanslmayr, Leipold, Pasto¨tter,
& Ba¨uml, 2009) and scenes (Depue et al., 2006;
Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007).
A key question, however, concerns how effec-
tively suppression works for emotional memories.
The literature contains diverging views on how
emotion might influence memory suppression.
On the one hand, suppressing emotional mem-
ories might be intrinsically more difficult because
these memories are better encoded, consolidated
and retrieved, than are non-emotional ones
(Hamann, 2001; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Levine
& Pisarro, 2004). Memory enhancement for
arousing emotional information also seems more
automatic than it is for non-arousing information
(Kensinger & Corkin, 2004). Moreover, the
intrusive nature of traumatic memories in post-
traumatic distress disorder (PTSD) reinforces this
view, suggesting that emotional memories are
harder to suppress (Shipherd & Beck, 2005). On
the other hand, the emotionality of memories
could motivate people to engage in cognitive
control over emotional memories. Disruption of
those memory traces might be easier precisely
because emotional memories are more accessible
(Levy & Anderson, 2012).
Studies examining the ability to suppress
retrieval of emotional memories produce evidence
for both arguments. Some authors have found
larger negative control effects for emotionally
negative compared to neutrals or positive mate-
rials (e.g., Depue et al., 2006; Joorman, Hertel,
Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005; Lambert, Good, &
Kirk, 2010), indicating people may be better able
or more motivated to forget unpleasant stimuli.
Others have found smaller effects for negative
materials (e.g., Marx, Marshall, & Castro, 2008;
Nørby, Lange, & Larsen, 2010). Others have
found no measurable effects for valence (Murray,
Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2011). It thus remains
unclear why the relative magnitude of negative
control effects for neutral and negative memories
has varied so much.
One possibility is that this variability stems
from participants adopting different strategies for
retrieval suppression across valence conditions and
studies. One strategy that has received consi-
derable interest is thought-substitution, which
often produces larger negative control effects
than are typically observed without specific strat-
egy instructions (e.g., Hertel & McDaniel, 2010;
Joormann, Hertel, LeMoult, & Gotlib, 2009). For
example, Aided participants are often provided
with alternative words (thought-substitutes) to
retrieve when no-think cues appear, whereas
Unaided participants received no specific gui-
dance. The Aided group often show a larger
negative control effect compared to the Unaided
group.
If thought-substitution increases the negative
control effect, uncontrolled variation in this
strategy may account for variability in how
effectively negative memories are forgotten. By
this hypothesis, forgetting emotional memories is
more difficult because inhibitory control is inade-
quate to handle the putative intrusiveness of
negative traces. Thus, unless participants resort
to thought-substitution, negative control effects
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for negative materials will be smaller. Greater nega-
tive control effects for negative memories could
arise if negative memories prompted thought-
substitution more often than neutral memories,
obscuring an underlying deficit in the ability to
inhibit negative memories.
A second mechanism contributing to retrieval
suppression is known as direct suppression (Levy
& Anderson, 2008). Direct suppression is assayed
by asking participants to avoid thinking of the
target memory without replacing it with anything
else; if the unwanted memory happens to come to
mind, participants simply are asked to block it out.
Using direct suppression instructions, several
studies have shown impaired recall for no-think
items (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergstro¨m,
de Fockert, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2009;
Hanslmayr et al., 2009). Importantly, both ERP
and fMRI research comparing direct suppression
with thought-substitution indicate that direct
suppression is mediated by distinct control me-
chanisms, with the former suppressing neural
processes that contribute to episodic retrieval
(Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergstro¨m et al.,
2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2010). For instance,
using effective connectivity methods, Benoit and
Anderson (2012) demonstrated that direct sup-
pression engages right dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex to down-regulate hippocampal activity,
but thought-substitution does not; thought-
substitution, by contrast, engages left ventrolateral
prefrontal cortex to retrieve substitute memories,
and is associated with increased retrieval-related
activity in the hippocampus. Thus, these qualita-
tively different approaches to memory control are
known to be dissociable at the neural level.
Importantly, they indicate that inhibitory control
can directly suppress retrieval of unwanted
memories, impairing their retention. It remains
unknown, however, whether direct suppression
impairs negatively valenced memories, as all
studies of direct suppression have used neutral
items. Direct suppression may be especially in-
effective in suppressing emotional content.
If inhibiting negative memories is difficult and
thought-substitution is necessary to control such
memories, then holding subjects’ strategy constant
by asking them to perform direct suppression
should reveal less forgetting for negative com-
pared to neutral memories. To examine this, we
gave participants direct suppression instructions
and encouraged them to use this approach,
reducing variability in strategies. Additionally,
we manipulated the emotional valence of the cue
(neutral vs. negative) and of the target (neutral vs.
negative). With this manipulation we could
disentangle how direct suppression affects materi-
als with different valences, and whether this effect
is related to either the cue or target valence. The
negative emotional valence of visible reminders
may capture participants’ attention, perhaps ex-
aggerating any modulatory influence that affect
may have on suppression (whether the influence is
positive, or negative).
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-eight undergraduates (Mage20.63 years,
SD2.03, 10 males) of the Erasmus University
Rotterdam participated for course credit. Partici-
pants were excluded if they had a diagnosis of
attention deficit disorder, did not have Dutch as a
first language (learned prior to age 5) or if they
were colour blind. Two participants were not used
in analyses because they had a score higher than 3
on three post-experimental non-compliance ques-
tions for no-think instructions.
Materials and design
The stimuli consisted of 72 weakly related Dutch
cuetarget word pairs (e.g., lanemeter, remove
cancer), 24 each in the think, no-think, and
baseline conditions. Words and word pairs were
in part selected from previous TNT studies
(Anderson & Green, 2001; Anderson et al.,
2004) and in part newly constructed. Care was
taken to ensure that cue and target words were
only relatable to each other and not to items from
other pairs. First through careful independent
inspection by the experimenter and the first
author, and then by ensuring that use of our
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materials was justified by inspection of the Dutch
association norms.
Of the 24 pairs in each condition, valence
(negative vs. neutral) of the cue and target words
was manipulated, resulting in four valence groups:
neutralneutral, negativeneutral, neutralnegative,
and negativenegative. Within each valence group
six pairs each made up the think, no-think, and
baseline conditions.
To assess valence and arousal, 25 students
who did not participate in the experiment rated
a large sample of words on valence ranging from
0 (Negative) to 50 (Positive) and arousal ranging
from 0 (Low) to 50 (High). Our 72 words were
selected from this sample. Words scoring under
16.7 on valence qualified as negative; those
between 16.7 and 33.3 as neutral. For each valence
group, valence (v), arousal (a), and word length
(wl) of cue and target is reported: cue for neutral
neutral pairs (Mv26.65; Ma15.34, Mwl5.44),
target for neutralneutral pairs (Mv27.88;
Ma15.33, Mwl5.28); cue for neutralnegative
pairs (Mv27.9; Ma17.33, Mwl5.61), target
for neutralnegative pairs (Mv10.5; Ma24.41
Mwl7.28); cue for negativeneutral pairs (Mv
10.98; Ma23.75, Mwl5.83), target for nega-
tive neutral pairs (Mv27.38; Ma17.64, Mwl
5.28); cue for negativenegative pairs (Mv
12.04; Ma23.67, Mwl6.72), target for
negativenegative pairs (Mv11.27; Ma23.61,
Mwl6.28).
Within each valence group, critical pairs were
counterbalanced so that each participated in every
condition of the Think/No-think task equally
often.
Think/No-think procedure
The experiment was run with E-prime 2.0
(Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA),
using a procedure based on Anderson et al.’s
(2004) experiment. During the phases, the ex-
perimenter sat behind the participant, scoring
vocal responses, giving participants instructions
and verbally encouraging them when necessary.
Learning phase. Each pair appeared once indivi-
dually in white font in the middle of a black screen
for 5,000 ms (400 ms ITI). Pseudo-randomised
testfeedback cycles followed in which partici-
pants responded with the target into a micro-
phone when a cue appeared. Cues disappeared
after 3,500 ms or when the participant responded.
Regardless of the answer, the correct target
appeared in green for 1,000 ms (400 ms ITI). As
is standard in the TNT task testfeedback cycles
continued until a participant acquired a minimum
of 50% of target answers for all conditions
combined. Participants had up to seven cycles to
achieve the criterion.
Think/No-think phase. Participants were told
that they would be receiving two types of trials
in which a cue word from one of the pairs would
appear for a short time. They were told that when
the cues appeared in blue, they should immedi-
ately think of the associated target word and to
keep it in mind while the cue was on screen.
When the cues appeared in yellow, however, they
were asked to stop themselves from thinking of
the associated word. For these no-think trials,
participants received direct suppression instruc-
tions, asking them to continuously focus on the
cue and suppress retrieval of the target by blocking
thoughts about it, without replacing it with other
thoughts. Each trial started with a fixation cross
(400 ms) followed by the cue (3,500 ms; 400 ms
ITI). The colour representing each condition was
counterbalanced over participants. The TNT
phase took 40 minutes.
Participants performed 24 practice filler trials
(12NT, 12T), followed by the experimental TNT
phase. The TNT phase consisted of six blocks
containing 96 think and no-think cues displayed
in a pseudo-randomised order, with each think
and no-think cue appearing twice; no more than
three T or NT items appeared consecutively.
Across all blocks, each think and no-think cue
was repeated 12 times. Breaks of 3045 seconds
occurred between blocks.
Final test phase. All 72 pairs were tested with a
‘‘same probe’’ test (e.g., lane_____). Each cue
SUPPRESSION OF EMOTIONAL MATERIAL
COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2013, 27 (6) 1125
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:2
8 1
4 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
appeared once in white font in the middle of a
black screen for 3,500 ms (400 ms ITI). Partici-
pants were instructed to recall all words regard-
less of their colour and instruction in the TNT
phase.
After the test, participants filled out a ques-
tionnaire in which they rated their success at
controlling memory for each pair on a scale from 0
(Never able to avoid thinking about the target word)
to 4 (Always able to avoid thinking about the target
word). They also rated how often they used each
of a collection of strategies on a scale from
0 (Never) to 4 (Always), and whether they
intentionally were non-compliant with no-think
instructions; 0 (Never) to 4 (Very frequently).
RESULTS
Analysis was based only on pairs for which
participants recalled the target on the final
learning test (Anderson et al., 2004). This
moderately high level of learning performance
yielded data in every cell for every participant.
Analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted
to examine the after-effects of memory control
in the final test. Counterbalancing condition
was included as a between-subjects factor in all
analyses to account for item effects, and non-
significant results of this factor (or its interactions)
are not reported. Instruction (think, no-think, and
baseline) was analysed as a within-subjects factor.
A multivariate test (PillaiBartlett trace; V), is
reported when the assumption of sphericity was
violated.
Learning phase
No participant required more than three cycles to
achieve the learning criterion of 50% (M1.69,
SD0.71). Overall, recall on the final learning
test was 75.35% (SE1.80), and was similar for
words from different instruction conditions: base-
line (M73.61, SE2.15), think (M75.00,
SE2.32), no-think (M77.43, SE1.82),
F(2, 70)2.06, p.05, g2p ¼ :06. Recall for the
valence conditions differed, F(3, 90)18.41,
pB.001, g2p ¼ :38, with M77.62 (SE3.05),
78.70 (SE1.99), 80.25 (SE1.82), and 62.81
(SE2.88) for neutralneutral, neutralnegative,
negativeneutral, and negativenegative, respec-
tively. Paired sample t-tests (against Bonferroni-
corrected a of .0083) revealed that only the
negativenegative condition differed from other
groups, ts(35)5.2, psB.001. For these reasons,
we conditioned our analysis of participants’ final
recall on having correctly learned items on the
final learning test.
Overall effects of memory control on the
final test
Instructions (baseline, no-think, think) affected
recall, V0.25, F(2, 29), pB.05, g2p ¼ :25. The
effect of instruction was followed up with two
contrasts, comparing baseline to either the think
or the no-think condition. Recall was poorer for
words in the no-think condition (M0.82, SE
0.04), compared to baseline (M0.91, SE
0.02), F(1, 33)6.86, pB.05, g2p ¼ :17. Con-
versely, recall for words in the think condition
(M0.94, SE0.01) was better than baseline,
F(1, 33)5.80, pB.05, g2p ¼ :14. Thus, the
present findings replicate previous reports (Benoit
& Anderson, 2012; Bergstro¨m et al., 2009;
Hanslmayr et al., 2009, 2010) showing that direct
suppression can impair recall of unwanted mem-
ories.
Effects of cue valence
To see whether cue valence influenced suppres-
sion success, Cue Valence (neutral, negative) was
included as a within-subject factor. Here again,
recall varied with instruction, V0.26, F(2, 32),
pB.01, g2p ¼ :26. Recall was lower for no-think
words compared to baseline words, F(1, 33)
4.96, pB.05, g2p ¼ :13, whereas recall was higher
for think words than for baseline words, F(1,
33)6.94, pB.05, g2p ¼ :17. Overall recall did
not vary with cue valence, FB1. Importantly, we
observed no Cue ValenceInstruction inter-
action, FB1. Consequently, the contrast compar-
ing baseline and no-think performance did not
interact with cue valence, FB1, nor did the
VAN SCHIE, GERAERTS, ANDERSON
1126 COGNITION AND EMOTION, 2013, 27 (6)
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
ras
mu
s U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 0
6:2
8 1
4 A
ug
us
t 2
01
5 
contrast of baseline and think performance, FB1
(see Figure 1, top row, for the effects of instruc-
tion as a function of cue valence). Thus, when
using a direct suppression strategy, people’s
ability to suppress unwanted memories did not
vary for memories cued by negative or neutral
reminders.
Effects of target valence
To see whether the valence of the to-be-
suppressed memories affected suppression success,
Target Valence (neutral, negative) was added as a
within-subjects factor. Again, recall varied with
instruction, V0.26, F(2, 32)5.65, pB.01,
g2p ¼ :26. Contrasts revealed that baseline
words were better recalled than no-think words,
F(1, 33)4.96, pB.05, g2p ¼ :13, but were
worse recalled than think words, F(1, 33)
6.94, pB.05, g2p ¼ :17. Overall recall varied
according to target valence, F(1, 33)4.95,
pB.05, g2p ¼ :13, with negatively valenced
words being recalled less. Importantly, there was
no interaction between Instruction and Target
Valence, FB1 (see Figure 1, lower row, for the
effects of instruction as a function of target
valence). Thus, when using a direct suppression
strategy, negative memories were neither more
nor less suppressible than were neutral memories.
These findings indicate that negatively valenced
memories are capable of being forgotten by a
direct suppression mechanism, and do not have to
be forgotten by thought-substitution.
Figure 1. Mean proportion of recall for baseline (dark grey), no-think (light grey) and think (white) on the final test, displayed for valence
of cue and target. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
SUPPRESSION OF EMOTIONAL MATERIAL
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Questionnaire analysis
Strategies for memory control. Most participants
(88.89%) frequently employed strategies during
no-think trials that are consistent with direct
suppression instructions, such as staring intently
at the hint word, repeating the hint word silently,
or letting their mind go blank in response to the
hint word. Thought-substitution strategies in
which people used the cue to generate an alter-
native word, thought or sound, were infrequently
used (13.89%). Thus, subjects largely followed our
instructions to use direct suppression.
Self-reported success of memory control. Participants
rated their success at controlling awareness for
each of the suppression cues. We combined their
ratings across items according to our distinctions:
success at control for neutral versus negative cues,
and success at control for neutral versus negative
targets. Ratings for pairs were considered only if
participants recalled the target word on the final
trial in the learning phase, ensuring that differ-
ences in learning for different pair types did not
contribute to success ratings. Participants reported
greater success of not thinking of the memories
associated to negative cues (M2.46, SE0.11)
compared to those associated to neutral cues
(M2.30, SE0.12), F(1, 33)5.94, pB.05,
g2p ¼ :15. For target valence, participants reported
being more successful at not thinking of negative
targets (M2.44, SE0.12), compared to neu-
tral targets (M2.32, SE0.11), although this
relationship was only marginal, F(1, 33)3.41,
p.073, g2p ¼ :09. These findings suggest, in-
triguingly, that, contrary to the notion that
negative memories are more difficult to suppress,
our participants experienced greater success at
controlling negative memories.
Success ratings and memory inhibition. Interest-
ingly, we found a relation between inhibition
scores (baseline recallno-think recall) and self-
reported success at memory control. There was a
relationship between success at controlling aware-
ness and inhibition scores for negative cues, r
.42, pB.01, and negative targets, r.37, pB.05.
This relationship was not present for neutral cues
or targets, p.05. Thus, at least for negative
memories, forgetting resulting from direct sup-
pression was related to the participants’ experience
of success in controlling conscious awareness.
DISCUSSION
The present study examined whether unwanted
memories could be forgotten with direct suppres-
sion, and compared the efficacy of this strategy for
both neutral and negatively valenced memories.
Consistent with recent work (Benoit & Anderson,
2012; Bergstro¨m et al., 2009; Hanslmayr et al.,
2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2010), negative control
effects were indeed observed, illustrating how
memory control can be accomplished without
thought-substitution, via inhibitory processes
that expel unwanted memories from awareness.
This conclusion is supported by participants’
high compliance with our instructions, and by
correlations between the negative control effect
and self-reports of control over awareness. Thus,
thought-substitution need not be engaged to
forget unwanted memories.
More importantly, however, the current study
establishes, for the first time, that emotionally
negative memories can be forgotten by direct
suppression. All previous studies demonstrating
negative control effects for emotional memories,
used no particular suppression instructions (e.g.,
Lambert et al., 2010; Marx et al., 2008; Murray
et al., 2011), and so it cannot be known what
processes caused these effects. Moreover, all
studies of direct suppression have used neutral
materials, leaving it unclear whether negative
memories can be controlled in this fashion. These
findings do not support the idea that negatively
valenced materials necessarily undermine people’s
ability to control memory. Nor do they clearly
address whether they might enhance memory
suppression. However, the simple verbal materials
in our study may not capture the emotional
qualities people experience in unpleasant life
events. Therefore, more work is necessary to
determine whether these effects generalise to
VAN SCHIE, GERAERTS, ANDERSON
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materials that are more naturalistic and autobio-
graphical and that might cause discomfort, shame,
embarrassment, or sadness (see Noreen &
MacLeod, 2012).
Our findings speak to the potential causes of
variability in the effect of valence on retrieval
suppression (see Anderson & Huddleston, 2011).
Of interest was whether variations in the sponta-
neous use of thought-substitution in prior studies
masked a deficit in inhibiting negative memories.
Crucially, when we controlled strategy with direct
suppression instructions, no inhibition deficit was
evident; neutral and negative memories were
comparably forgotten. Because the instructions
used here are known to trigger top-down inhibi-
tory modulation of hippocampal activity by dor-
solateral prefrontal cortex (Benoit & Anderson,
2012), our manipulation provided a theoretically
refined test of the hypothesised difficulty in
inhibiting negative memories. Indeed, to our
surprise, participants judged pairs including ne-
gative cues or targets to have been easier to keep
out of awareness than pairs with neutral cues or
targets. Interestingly, success ratings predicted
forgetting for negative, but not neutral memories,
suggesting that controlling awareness of negative
memories may be more reliant on inhibition,
consistent with the possibility that they are more
intrusive. Even with this possibility, however, our
results as a whole, do not suggest that inhibition is
less able to contend with negative materials.
Nevertheless, uncontrolled variations in thought-
substitution may still explain variability in prior
studies as to whether negative or neutral mem-
ories are more forgettable. Our findings simply
show that this variability in thought-substitution,
if it exists, does not mask a deficit in inhibiting
negative memories.
Our experiment also manipulated both cue
and target valence to examine which influences
memory suppression. The majority of studies
examining the negative control effect either
show enhanced forgetting for neutral (Marx
et al., 2008; Nørby et al., 2010) or for emotional
materials (Depue et al., 2006; Joorman et al.,
2005; Lambert et al., 2010). We observed neither
effect, regardless of whether we considered cue or
target valence. Nevertheless, these findings offer
insights into several studies that show preferential
suppression of emotional or non-emotional ma-
terial. For instance, our study is the only one
comparable to Lambert et al. (2010), who ma-
nipulated cue rather than target valence. Lambert
et al. (2010) reported enhanced suppression for
negative pairs, yet solely for neutral targets
associated with a negative cue compared to neutral
items paired with a positive cue. Because Lambert
et al. (2010) lacked a condition with neutral cues,
it was unclear whether these results reflected good
forgetting of negative experiences, or difficulty
suppressing positive items. Our finding of com-
parable forgetting for negative and neutral mem-
ories is compatible with theirs, but suggests that
their finding may reflect diminished suppression
of positive events and not enhanced suppression of
negative ones.
Nørby et al. (2010) found greater forgetting for
neutral than negative pairs, and suggested that
this difference arose from the random intermixing
of negative and neutral pairs. By this view, the
difficulty in predicting emotional qualities of an
upcoming item enhances the item’s emotional
salience, revealing how difficult it is to suppress
negative memories. Studies in which predictability
of emotional material is high, for instance through
employing different blocks for emotional material
(e.g., Depue et al., 2006, 2007), will show similar
forgetting for negative and neutral items by this
view, because the negative items are, in effect, less
negative. Although we did not seek to address this
issue, our findings suggest that random intermix-
ing of valence types may not have the effects
hypothesised by Nørby et al. (2010). In our study,
negative and neutral items were intermixed and
we nevertheless found emotional materials were
comparably suppressible to non-emotional mate-
rials. Indeed, participants judged negative items to
be easier to keep out of awareness. Clearly, our
results are not in line with their account. Their
finding of diminished negative control effects for
negative materials thus remains unexplained.
One factor that may also contribute to varia-
bility in how suppression affects retention of
negative and neutral memories concerns the
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semantic interrelatedness of the materials being
suppressed. Because words of negative valence
stem from a small set of categories (e.g., death,
fear and violence) repeated retrieval of stimuli in
the think condition (e.g., swampdeath) may
affect later recall in the no-think condition (e.g.,
knifemurder) when there is high interrelated-
ness. Goodmon and Anderson (2011) have shown
that high semantic relatedness in another inhibi-
tion phenomenon*retrieval-induced forgetting*
abolished forgetting effects. A similar principle
may apply to retrieval suppression. The presence of
uncontrolled inter-pair relationships may account
for why Nørby et al. (2010) failed to observe nega-
tive control effects whereas we did, particularly
given our efforts to control such relationships.
In conclusion, our results establish that nega-
tive memories may be forgotten via direct sup-
pression and that thought-substitution is not
essential (Benoit & Anderson, 2012; Bergstro¨m
et al., 2009; Hanslmayr et al., 2009). These
findings imply that reports of forgetting of both
negative and neutral memories in the TNT
paradigm are unlikely to be due to deficient
inhibitory control for negative memories that is
compensated for by thought-substitution. Though
we found that negative memories were inhibited,
it remains possible that variability in the sponta-
neous use of thought-substitution occurs in other
studies, potentially underpinning differences in
the size of negative control effects across valence
conditions. For these reasons, we recommend
holding participants’ strategic approach to the
task constant to better understand the effects
of emotion on the ability to suppress unwanted
memories.
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